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Abstract
On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Mary-
land, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members
using the Scantegrity II voting system—the first time
any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy
has been used in a binding governmental election. This
case study describes the various efforts that went into
the election—including the improved design and imple-
mentation of the voting system, streamlined procedures,
agreements with the city, and assessments of the experi-
ences of voters and poll workers.
The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, in-
volved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation
codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and
absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provi-
sional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning
with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end
verifiability based on optional web-based voter verifica-
tion of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded author-
ities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed
software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers.
Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was
a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting
systems can be effectively used and accepted by the gen-
eral public.
1 Introduction
The November 2009 municipal election of the city of
Takoma Park, Maryland marked the first time that any-
one could verify that the votes were counted correctly in
a secret ballot election for public office without having
to be present for the entire proceedings. This article is a
case study of the Takoma Park election, describing what
was done—from the time the Scantegrity Voting Sys-
tem Team (SVST) was approached by the Takoma Park
Board of Elections in February 2008, to the last crypto-
graphic election audit in December 2009—and what was
learned. While the paper provides a simple summary of
survey results, the focus of this paper is not usability but
the engineering process of bringing a new cryptographic
approach to solve a complex practical problem involving
technology, procedures, and laws.
With the Scantegrity II voting system, voters mark op-
tical scan paper ballots with pens, filling the oval for
the candidates of their choice. These ballots are handled
as traditional ballots, permitting all the usual automated
and manual counting, accounting, and recounting. Ad-
ditionally, the voting system provides a layer of integrity
protection through its use of invisible-ink confirmation
codes. When voters mark ballot ovals using a decoder
pen, confirmation codes printed in invisible ink are re-
vealed. Interested voters can note down these codes to
check them later on the election website. The codes are
generated randomly for each race and each ballot, and
hence do not reveal the corresponding vote. A final tally
can be computed from the codes and the system provides
a public digital audit trail of the computation.
Election audits in Scantegrity II are not restricted to
privileged individuals and can be performed by voters
and other interested parties. Developers and election au-
thorities are unable to significantly falsify an election
outcome without an overwhelming probability of an au-
dit failure [8]. The other side of the issue of integrity,
also solved by the system, is that false claims of impro-
priety in the recording and tally of the votes are readily
revealed to be false. 1
All the software used in the election—for ballot au-
thoring, printing, scanning and tally—was published
well in advance of the election as commented, buildable
source code, which may be a first in its own right. More-
over, commercial off-the-shelf scanners were adapted to
receive ballots in privacy sleeves from voters, making the
1Note that a threat present and not commonly addressed in paper
ballot systems is that additional marks could be added to ballots by
those with special access. Such attacks are made more difficult by
Scantegrity II.
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overall system relatively inexpensive.
Despite several limitations of the implementation, we
found that the amount of extra work needed by officials
to use Scantegrity II while administering an election is
acceptable given the promise of improved voter satisfac-
tion and indisputability of the outcome. Indeed, discus-
sions are ongoing with the Board of Elections of the city
regarding continued use of the system in future elections.
Another observation from the election is that the elec-
tion officials and voters surveyed seemed to appreciate
the system. Since voters who do not wish to verify can
simply proceed as usual, ignoring the codes revealed in
the filled ovals, the system is least intrusive for these vot-
ers. Those voters who did check their codes, and even
many who did not, seem to appreciate the opportunity.
This paper describes the entire process of adapting the
Scantegrity II system to handle the Takoma Park elec-
tion, including the agreement with the city, printing the
special ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, ac-
tually running the election, and verifying that the election
outcome was correct.
Organization of this case study The next section pro-
vides an overview of related work in this area, summa-
rizing previous experiments with Scantegrity II and other
E2E systems in practical settings.
Section 3 describes in more detail the setting for the
election: giving details about Takoma Park and their
election requirements. Section 4 gives more details of
the Scantegrity II voting system, including a description
of how one can “audit” an election. Section 5 provides
an overview of the implementation of the voting system
for the November 3, 2009 Takoma Park municipal elec-
tion, including the scanner software, the cryptographic
back-end, and the random-number generation routines.
Section 6 gives a chronological presentation and time-
line of the steps taken to run the November election,
including the outcome of the voter verification and the
audits. It also gives the results of the election, with
some performance and integrity metrics. Section 7 re-
ports some results of the exit surveys taken of voters and
pollworkers.
Section 8 discusses the high-level lessons learned from
this election. Section 9 provides some conclusions, ac-
knowledgements, and disclosures required by the pro-
gram committee.
2 Related Work
Chaum was the first to propose the use of cryptogra-
phy for the purpose of secure elections [5]. This was
followed by almost two decades of work in improving
security and privacy guarantees (for a nice survey, see
Adida [1]), most recently under the rubric of end-to-end
voting systems. These voting system proposals provide
integrity (any attempt to change the tally can be caught
with very high probability by audits which are not re-
stricted to privileged individuals) and ballot secrecy.
The first of these proposals include protocols by
Chaum [6] and Neff [19], which were implemented soon
after (Chaum’s as Citizen-Verified Voting [16] and Neff’s
by VoteHere). Several more proposals with prototypes
followed: Preˆt a` Voter [10], Punchscan [21, 15], the pro-
posal of Kutylowski and Zago´rski [18] as Voting Ducks,
and Simple Verifiable Voting [4] as Helios [2] and Vote-
Box [24].
Making end-to-end systems usable in real elections
has proven to be challenging. We are aware of the follow-
ing previous binding elections held using similar verifi-
cation technology: the Punchscan elections for the grad-
uate students’ union of the University of Ottawa (2007)
and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibil-
ity (2007); the Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES)
public elections in the Netherlands in 2004 and 2006; the
Helios elections of the Recteur of Universite´ Catholique
de Louvain [3] (2009) and the Princeton undergraduate
student government election (2009), as well as a student
election using Preˆt a` Voter.
Only the RIES system has been used in a governmen-
tal election; however, it is meant for remote (absentee)
voting and, consequently, does not offer strong ballot se-
crecy guarantees. For this reason, it has been recom-
mended that the RIES system not be used for regular
public elections [17, 20]. Helios is also a remote vot-
ing system, and offers stronger ballot secrecy guarantees
over RIES. The Punchscan elections were the closest to
this study, but they did not rise to the level of public
elections. They did not have multiple ballot styles, the
users of the system were not a broad cross-segment of
the population as in Takoma Park, the system implemen-
tors were deeply involved in administering the elections,
and no active auditors were established to audit the elec-
tions. To date, this study is the most comparable use case
of E2E technology to that of a typical optical scan elec-
tion.
The case study reported here is based on a series of
systems successively developed, tested, and deployed by
a team of researchers included among the present au-
thors originating with the Punchscan system. Although
it used paper ballots, the Punchscan system did not al-
low manual recounts, a feature that the team recognized
as needing to be designed into the next generation of
systems. The result was Scantegrity [9], which retained
hand-countable ballots, and was tested in a number of
small elections. With Scantegrity, however, it was too
easy to trigger an audit that would require scrutiny of the
physical ballots. The Scantegrity II system [7, 8], de-
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ployed in Takoma Park, was a further refinement to ad-
dress this problem by allowing a public statistical test of
whether voter complaints actually reflect a discrepancy
or whether they are without basis. Note: in the rest of
the paper, “Scantegrity” refers to the voting team or to
the Scantegrity II voting system; which one is typically
easily determined from context.
As part of the Scantegrity agreement with Takoma
Park (see section 3), a “mock election” [26] was held
in April 2009 to test and demonstrate feasibility of the
Scantegrity system during Takoma Park’s annual Arbor
day celebration. Volunteer voters voted for their favorite
tree. A number of revisions and tweaks to the Scant-
egrity system were made as a result of the mock elec-
tion, including: ballot revisions (no detachable chit, but
instead a separate voter verification card), pen revisions
(two-ended, with different sized tips), scanner station re-
visions (better voter flow, no monitor, two scanners), pri-
vacy sleeve (no lock, no clipboard, folding design, feeds
directly into scanner), and confirmation codes (three dec-
imal digits).
3 The Setting
For several reasons, the implementation of voting sys-
tems is a difficult task. Most voting system users—
i.e. the voters—are untrained and elections happen infre-
quently. Voter privacy requirements preclude the usual
sorts of feedback and auditing methods common in other
applications, such as banking. Also, government regula-
tions and pre-existing norms in the conduct of elections
are difficult to change. These issues can pose significant
challenges when deploying new voting systems, and it
is therefore useful to understand the setting in which the
election took place.
About Takoma Park The city of Takoma Park is lo-
cated in Montogomery County, Maryland, shares a city
line with Washington, D.C, and is governed by a mayor
and a six-member City Council. The city has about
17,000 residents2 and almost 11,000 registered voters
[27, pg. 10]. A seven-member Board of Elections con-
ducts local elections in collaboration with the City Clerk.
In the past, the city has used hand counts and optical scan
voting, as well as DREs for state elections.
The Montgomery County US Census Update Data
of 2005 provides some demographic information about
the city. Median household income in 2004 was
$48,675. The percentage of households with comput-
ers was 87.4%, and about 32% of Takoma Park residents
above the age of twenty-five had a graduate, professional
or doctoral degree. It is an ethnically diverse city: 45.8%
2See http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/about.html.
of its residents identify their race as “White,” 36.3% as
“Black,” 9.7% as “Asian or Pacific Islander” and 8.2% as
“Other” (individuals of Hispanic origin form the major
component of this category). Further, 44.4% of its house-
holds have a foreign-born head of household or spouse,
and 44.8% of residents above the age of five spoke a lan-
guage other than English at home.
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) Takoma Park has used
IRV in municipal city elections since 2006. IRV is a
ranked choice system where each voter assigns each can-
didate a rank according to her preferences. The rules3
used by Takoma Park (and the Scantegrity software) for
counting IRV ballots are relatively standard, so we omit
further discussion for lack of space.
Agreement with the City As with any municipal gov-
ernment in the US, Takoma Park is allowed to choose its
own voting system for city elections. For county, state,
and federal elections, it is constrained by county, state,
and federal election laws.
Takoma Park and the SVST signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU), in which the SVST agreed
to provide equipment, software, training assistance, and
technical support. The City of Takoma Park agreed to
provide election-related information on the municipality,
election workers, consumable materials, and perform or
provide all other election duties or materials not provided
by us. No goods or funds were exchanged.
According to the MOU, if approved by the city coun-
cil, the election was to be conducted in compliance with
all applicable laws and policies of the city. This included
using Instant Runoff Voting as defined by the City of
Takoma Park Municipal Charter.
The SVST also agreed to pursue an accessible ballot-
marking device for the election, but was later relieved of
satisfying this requirement. Unfortunately, Scantegrity
is not yet fitted with a voter interface for those with vi-
sual or motor disabilities, and accessible user interfaces
were also not used in Takoma Park’s previous optical
scan elections.
Timeline Scantegrity was approached by the Takoma
Park Board of Elections in late February 2008, and, after
considering other voting systems, the Board voted to rec-
ommend a contract with Scantegrity in June 2008. Fol-
lowing a public presentation to the City Council in July
2008, the MOU was signed in late November 2008, about
nine months after the initial contact.
3For the exact laws used by Takoma Park, see page 22 of http:
//www.takomaparkmd.gov/code/pdf/charter.pdf. Sec-
tion (f), concerning eliminating multiple candidates, was used in our
implementation for tie-breaking only.
3
The SVST held an open workshop in February 2009 to
discuss the use of Scantegrity in both the mock and real
elections. This workshop was held at the Takoma Park
Community Center and was attended by Board of Elec-
tion members, the City Clerk, current members (and a
retired member) from the Montgomery County Board of
Elections, as well as a representative each from the Pew
Trust and FairVote. Following the mock election in April
2009, the SVST proposed a redesigned system taking
into consideration feedback from voters and poll work-
ers (through surveys) and the Board of Elections. The
Board voted to recommend use of the redesigned system
in July 2009; this was made official in the city election
ordinance in September 2009. 4 Beginning around June
2009, a meeting with representatives of the SVST was
on the agenda of most monthly Board of Election meet-
ings. Additionally, SVST members met many times with
the City Clerk and the Chair of the Board of Elections to
plan for the election.
The final list of candidates was available approxi-
mately a month before the election, on October 2. The
Scantegrity meetings initializing the data and ballots
were held in October (see Section 6), as was a final work-
shop to test the system. Absentee ballots were sent out
by the City Clerk in the middle of October. The SVST
delivered ballots to the City Clerk in late October, and
early voting began almost a week before the election, on
October 28. Poll worker training sessions were held by
the city on October 28 and 31, and polling on November
3, 2009, from 7 am to 8 pm. The final Scantegrity audits
were completed on 17 December 2010; all auditors were
of the opinion that the election outcomes were correct
(for details see section 6).
4 Scantegrity Overview
In this section, we give an overview of the Scantegrity
system. For more detailed descriptions, see [7, 8].
Voter Experience At a high level, the voter experience
is as follows. First, a voter checks in at the polling place
and receives a Scantegrity ballot (See Figure 2) with a
privacy sleeve. The privacy sleeve is used to cover the
ballot and keep private the contents of the ballot. Inside
the voting booth, there is a special “decoder pen” and a
stack of blank “voter verification cards.” The voter uses
the decoder pen to mark the ballot. As on a conventional
optical scan ballot, she fills in the bubble next to each of
her selections. Marking a bubble with the decoder pen
simultaneously leaves a dark mark inside the bubble and
4See http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/clerk/agenda/
items/2009/090809-3.pdf, section 2-D, page 2.
reveals a previously hidden confirmation code printed in
invisible ink.
If the voter wishes to verify her vote later on the elec-
tion website, she can copy her ballot ID and her revealed
confirmation codes onto a voter verification card. She
keeps the verification card for future reference. She then
takes her ballot to the scanning station and feeds the bal-
lot into an optical scanner, which reads the ballot ID and
the marked bubbles.
If a voter makes a mistake, she can ask a poll worker
to replace her ballot with a new one. The first ballot is
marked “spoiled,” and its ballot ID is added to the list of
spoiled ballot IDs maintained by the election judges.
The voter can verify her vote on the election website
by checking that her revealed confirmation codes and
ballot ID have been posted correctly. If she finds any
discrepancy, the voter can file a complaint through the
website, within a complaint period. When filing a com-
plaint, the voter must provide the confirmation codes that
were revealed on her ballot as evidence of the validity of
the complaint.
Ballots The Scantegrity ballot looks similar to a con-
ventional optical scan ballot (see Figure 2 for a sam-
ple ballot used in the election). It contains a list of the
choices and bubbles beside each choice. Marking a bub-
ble reveals a random 3-digit confirmation code.
Confirmation Codes The confirmation codes are
unique within each contest on each ballot, and are gener-
ated independently and uniformly pseudorandomly. The
confirmation code corresponding to any given choice on
any given ballot is hidden and unknown to any voter until
the voter marks the bubble for that choice.
Digital Audit Trail Prior to the election, a group of
election trustees secret-share a seed to a pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG). The trustees then input their
shares to a trusted workstation to generate the pseudo-
random confirmation codes for all ballots, as well as a
set of tables of cryptographic commitments to form the
digital audit trail. These tables allow individual voters to
verify that their votes have been included in the tally, and
allow any interested party to verify that the tally has been
computed correctly, without revealing how any individ-
ual voter voted.
Auditing After the election, any interested party can
audit the election by using software to check the correct-
ness of the data and final tally on the election website.
Additionally, at the polling place on the day of the elec-
tion, any interested party can choose to audit the printing
of the ballots. A print audit consists of marking all of the
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bubbles on a ballot, and then either making a photocopy
of the fully-marked ballot or copying down all of the re-
vealed confirmation codes. The ballot ID is recorded by
an election judge as audited. After the election, one can
check that all of the confirmation codes on the audited
ballot, and their correspondence with ballot choices, are
posted correctly on the election website.
5 Implementation
The election required a cryptographic backend, a scan-
ner, and a website. These 3 components form the ba-
sic election system and their interaction is described in
Figure 1. In addition, Takoma Park required software to
resolve write-in candidate selections and produce a for-
matted tally on election night.
Scantegrity protects against manipulation of election
results and maintains, but does not improve, the privacy
properties of optical scan voting systems that use se-
rial numbers. To compromise voter privacy using Scant-
egrity features, an attacker must associate receipts to vot-
ers and determine what confirmation numbers are as-
sociated to each candidate. This is similar to violat-
ing privacy by other means; for example, an attacker
could compromise the scanner and determine the order
in which voters used the device, or examine physical
records and associate serial numbers to voters. The scan-
ner and backend components protect voter privacy, but
the website and the write-in candidate resolver do not
because they work with public information only.
Each component is written in Java. We describe the
implementation and functions of each one in the follow-
ing sections.
Backend The cryptographic backend that provides the
digital audit trail is a modified version of the Punchscan
backend [21]. This backend is written in Java 1.5 using
the BouncyCastle cryptography library. 5 Key manage-
ment in the Punchscan backend is handled by a simple
threshold [25] cryptosystem that asks for a username and
password from the election officials.
We chose the Punchscan backend over newer propos-
als [7] because it had already been implemented and
tested in previous elections [13, 28]. At the interface be-
tween the Scantegrity frontend and the Punchscan back-
end, as described in [23], the permutations used by
Punchscan are matched to a permutation of precomputed
confirmation codes for Scantegrity that correspond to the
permutation of codes printed on the ballot.
The Punchscan backend uses a two-stage mix process
based on cryptographic commitments published before
the election. Each mix, the left mix and the right mix,
5http://www.bouncycastle.org
takes marked positions as input, shuffles the ballots, and
reorders each marked position on each ballot according
to a prescribed (pre-committed) permutation. The result
is the set of cleartext votes, where position 0 corresponds
to candidate 0, 1 to 1, etc. Between the two mixes, for
example, position 0 may in fact correspond to candidate
5, depending on the permutation in the right mix.
The Punchscan backend partitions [22] each contest
such that each contest is treated as an independent elec-
tion with a separate set of commitments. In the case of
Takoma Park, each ward race and the mayor’s race are
treated as separate elections. (The announcement of sep-
arate mayoral race vote counts for each ward is required
by Takoma Park). The scanner is responsible for creating
the input files for each individual election.
Election officials hold a series of meetings using the
backend to conduct an election. Before the election, dur-
ing Meeting 1 (Initialization), they choose passwords that
are shares of a master key that generates all other data for
the election in a deterministic fashion. After each meet-
ing, secret data (such as the mapping from confirmation
codes to candidates) is erased from the hard drive and re-
generated from the passwords when it is needed again.
In Meeting 1 the backend software creates a digital au-
dit trail by committing to the Punchscan representation
of candidate choices and to the mixset: the left and right
mix operations for each ballot. Later, during Meeting 2
(Pre-Election Audit), the backend software responds to
an audit of the trail demonstrating that the mixset de-
crypts ballots correctly. At this time, the backend also
commits to the Scantegrity front-end, consisting of the
linkage between the Scantegrity front-end and its Punch-
scan backend used for decryption.
After the election, election officials run Meeting 3 (Re-
sults), publishing the election results and the voted con-
firmation numbers. For the purposes of the tally audit,
the system also publishes the outputs of the left and right
mixes. In Meeting 4 (Post-Election Audit), officials re-
spond to the challenges of the tally computation audit.
Either the entire left mix or the entire right mix opera-
tions are revealed, and the auditor checks them against
data published in Meeting 3.
The Meeting 4 audit catches, with probability one half,
a voting system that cheats in the tally computation. To
provide higher confidence in the results, the backend cre-
ates multiple sets of left and right mixes; in Takoma Park,
we created 40 sets for each election, 20 of which were
audited. Given 2 contests per ballot and 40 sets of left
and right mixes, there are a total of 160 commitments
per ballot in the audit trail, in addition to a commitment
per contestant per ballot for each confirmation number
(15-18, depending on the Ward).
The implementation uses two classes of “random”
number sources. The first is used to generate the dig-
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Figure 1: Election Workflow. The core election work flow in Scantegrity is similar to an optical scan election:
a software backend creates ballot images that are printed, used by voters, and scanned. The results are fed to the
backend which creates the tally. The audit capacity is provided by 3 extra steps: (1) create the initial digital audit trail
and audit a portion of it, (2) audit the ballots to ensure correctness when printing, and (3) audit the final tally.
ital audit trail, and the second is used for auditing the
trail. Both types of sources must be unpredictable to an
adversary, and we describe each in turn.
Digital Audit Trail The Punchscan backend generates
the mixes and commitments using entropy provided by
each election official during initialization of the thresh-
hold encryption. This provided a “seed” for a pseudo-
random number generator (based on the SHA256 hash
function).
We also used this random source to generate the con-
firmation numbers when changing the Punchscan back-
end to support Scantegrity. Unfortunately, we introduced
an error in the generation when switching from alphanu-
meric to numeric confirmation numbers as a result of
findings in the Mock election (see Section 2). This re-
sulted in approximately 8.5 bits of entropy as opposed to
the expected 10 bits. We discovered this error after we
started printing and it was too late to regenerate the audit
trail.
The error increased the chance that an adversary could
guess an unseen confirmation code to approximately one
in 360 rather than the intended one in 1000; a small de-
crease in the protection afforded against malicious voters
trying to guess unseen codes in order to discredit the sys-
tem.
Auditing Random numbers are needed to generate
challenges for the various auditing steps (print audit, ran-
domized partial checking). These numbers should be un-
predictable in advance to an adversary. They should also
be “verifiable” after the fact as having come from a “truly
random” source that is not manipulable by an adversary.
We chose to use the closing prices of the stocks in
the Dow Jones Industrial Average as our verifiable but
unpredictable source to seed the pseudorandom number
generator (the use of stock prices for this purpose was
first described in [11]). These prices are sufficiently un-
predictable for our purposes, yet verifiable after the fact.
However, it turns out that post-closing “adjustments” can
sometimes be made to the closing prices, which can
make these prices less than ideal for our purposes in
terms of verifiability.
Scanner Software The original intent of Scantegrity
was to build on top of an existing optical scan system.
There was no pre-existing optical scan system in use at
Takoma Park, so we implemented a simple system using
EeePC 900 netbooks and Fujitsu 6140 scanners.
The scanning software is written in Java 1.6. It uses a
bash shell script to call the SANE scanimage program 6
and polls a directory on the filesystem to acquire bal-
lot images. Once an image is acquired it uses circular
alignment marks to adjust the image, reads the barcode
using the ZXing QRCode Library, 7 and uses a simple
threshold algorithm to determine if a mark is made on
the ballot.
Individual races on each ballot are identified by ward
information in the barcode, which is non-sequential and
randomly generated. The ballot id in the barcode and
the web verification numbers on each ballot are different
numbers, and the association between each number type
is protected by the backend system. Write-in candidate
areas, if that candidate is selected by the voter, are stored
as clipped raw images with the ballot scan results. Ballot
scan results are stored in a random location in a memory
mapped file.
The current implementation of the scanning software
does not protect data in transit to the backend, which
poses a risk for denial of service. Checking of the cor-
rectness of the scanner is done through the Scantegrity
audit. The data produced by the scanner does not com-
promise voter privacy, but—assuming an attacker could
intercept scanner data—voter privacy could be compro-
mised at the scanner through unique write-in candidates
on the ballot, through a compromised scanner, by bugs
in the implementation, or by relying on the voter to make
readable copies of the barcode to get a ballot id.
6http://www.sane-project.org/
7http://code.google.com/p/zxing/
6
Tabulator/Write-In Software At the request of
Takoma Park we created an additional piece of software,
the Election Resolution Manager (ERM), that allows
election judges to manually determine for each write-in
vote what candidate the vote should be counted toward.
The other responsibility of the ERM is to act as part of
the backend. It collates data from each scanner and pre-
pares the input files for the backend.
To resolve write-ins with this software, the user cy-
cles through each image, and either types in the name of
the intended candidate or selects the name from a list of
previously identified candidates composed of the original
candidates and any previously typed candidate names.
The user is not shown the whole ballot, so he does not
know what the other selections are on that ballot, or what
rank the write-in was given. We call this process resolv-
ing a vote because the original vote is changed from the
generic “Write-In” candidate to the candidate that was
intended by the voter. The ERM produces a PDF of
each image, the candidate selection for that image, and
a unique number to identify the selection.
Scantegrity handles write-in candidates just like other
optical scan systems by treating the write-in position
as a candidate. Therefore, the backend does not know
how each write-in position was resolved, and two results
records are created: one with write-in resolution pro-
vided by the ERM, and one without write-in resolution
provided by the backend.
To check the additional record generated by the ERM,
an observer reduces the resolved results record and veri-
fies that the set of resolved ballots is the same as the set of
unresolved ballots. To audit that the judges chose the cor-
rect candidates for each write-in, the observer refers to
the PDF generated during write-in resolution. The PDF
allows the observer to reference each resolved ballot en-
try in the resolved results file and verify that the image
was properly transcribed.
One caveat of this approach is that if a write-in candi-
date wins, a malicious authority could modify these im-
ages to change results, but could not deny that the write-
in position had received a winning number of votes. This
situation would require additional procedures to verify
the write-ins (e.g. a hand count, and/or careful audit of
the transcriptions by each judge).
Website Beyond communicating the election outcome
itself, the role of the election website is to serve as a “bul-
letin board” (BB) to broadcast the cryptographic audit
data set (i.e., cryptographic commitments, responses to
audit challenges, etc). In addition, voters can use this
website to check their receipts, and file a dispute if the
receipt is misreported. We provided an implementation
with these features written in Java 1.6. It used the Stripes
Framework 8 and an Apache Derby database backend. 9
In practice, we only used part of this implementation.
Originally, our plan was to have Takoma Park host the
website, but officials chose a hybrid approach where they
hosted election information and results. That website
would link to our server to provide a receipt checking
tool and audit data. After the election, officials would
provide us with a copy of the public data files to pub-
lish. This decision caused a number of changes to our
approach.
We decided to only use the receipt checking code from
the implementation, and, to make downloading more
convenient for auditors, post all election data on our pub-
licly available subversion repository. 10 Additionally,
both auditors agreed to mirror the data.
A primary security requirement for the Scantegrity
BB is to provide authenticated broadcast communication
from election officials to the public. We met this require-
ment with digital signatures. A team member (Carback)
created signed copies of each file with gnupg 11 using his
public key from May 28, 2009.
Without authenticated communication, it would be im-
possible to prove if different results were provided to dif-
ferent people. Our specific approach to the website re-
quires observers to verify signatures and check with each
other if they receive identical copies of the data (and ver-
ify the consistency of the signatures over time). Our au-
ditors, Adida and Zagorski, performed these actions, but
we do not know the extent of this communication other-
wise. As usual with our approach to Scantegrity, we are
enabling detection of errors (genuine or malicious).
There are several potential threats to the bulletin board
model–we will briefly enumerate some of them. At a
high level, threats pertain primarily to misreporting of
results, or to voter identification. With regard to results
reporting, an adversary may attempt to misreport results
by substituting actual election data with false data. In
the event that all parties verify signatures of information
they receive, and check consistency with the signed files,
incorrect confirmation codes on the bulletin board would
be detected by voters, and incorrect computation of the
tally by anyone checking the tally computation audit. If
the voter checking confirmation codes does not check
consistency with the rest of the bulletin board (by, for ex-
ample, downloading the bulletin board data, checking all
the signatures and checking that his or her confirmation
code is also correctly noted in the entire bulletin board
data) he or she may be deceived into believing their bal-
lot was accurately recorded and counted. Similarly, if
8http://www.stripesframework.org/
9http://db.apache.org/derby/
10http://scantegrity.org/svn/data/
takoma-nov3-2009/
11http://www.gnupg.org/
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the various signatures are not cross checked across indi-
viduals or observed over time, an adversary may replace
the confirmation codes after they have been checked, or
send different ones to voters and to auditors. An adver-
sary may also attempt an identification attack, whereby
the objective is to link voter identities with receipt data,
such as by recording IP addresses of voters who check
their receipts.
6 The Election
In this section, we describe the election as events unfold
chronologically over time.
6.1 Preparations
Preparations for the election include running the first 2
backend meetings, and creating the ballot.
Independent Auditors The Board of Elections re-
quested cryptographers Dr. Ben Adida (Center for Re-
search on Computation and Society, Harvard University)
and Dr. Filip Zago´rski (Institute of Mathematics and
Computer Science, Wroclaw University of Technology,
Poland) to perform independent audits of the digital data
published by Scantegrity in general, and of the tally com-
putation in particular. Dr. Adida 12 and Dr. Zago´rski 13
maintained websites describing the audits and the results
of the audits, and Dr. Adida also blogged the audit. 14
Before the election, Dr. Adida pointed out several in-
stances when the Scantegrity information was insuffi-
cient; Scantegrity documentation was updated as a result.
The Board of Elections also requested Ms. Lillie
Coney (Associate Director, Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center and Public Policy Coordinator for the Na-
tional Committee for Voting Integrity (NCVI)) to per-
form print audits on Election Day. Ms. Coney chose
ballots at random through the day, exposed the confir-
mation codes for all options on the ballot, and kept these
with her until after the end of the complaint period, when
Scantegrity opened commitments to all unvoted and un-
spoiled ballots (and hence to all ballots she had audited).
Ms. Coney then checked that the correspondence be-
tween codes and confirmation numbers on her ballots
matched those on the website.
Both tasks, of print audits and digital data audits, can
be performed by voters. Digital data audits can also be
performed by any observers. In future elections, when
the general population and Takoma Park voters are more
12http://sites.google.com/site/
takomapark2009audit/
13http://zagorski.im.pwr.wroc.pl/scantegrity/
14http://benlog.com/articles/category/
takoma-park-2009/
familiar with end-to-end elections, it is anticipated that
voters (and, in particular, candidate representatives) will
perform such audits.
Meeting 1 Four election officials (the City Clerk, the
Chair, Vice Chair and a member of the Board of Elec-
tions: Jessie Carpenter, Anne Sergeant, Barrie Hofmann
and Jane Johnson, respectively) were established as elec-
tion trustees in Meeting 1, held on October 12 2009.
It was explained to the trustees that, through their pass-
words, they would generate the confirmation codes and
share the secret used to tally election results. Further,
it was explained that, without more than a threshold of
passwords, the election could not be tallied by Scant-
egrity, and that if a threshold number of passwords was
not accessible (if they were forgotten, for example, or
trustees were unavailable due to sickness) the only avail-
able counts would be manual counts. A threshold of two
trustees was determined based on anticipated availabil-
ity of the officials, and it was explained that two trustees
could collude to determine the correspondence between
confirmation numbers and codes, and hence that each
trustee should keep her password secret.
The trustees generated commitments to the decryption
paths for each of 5000 ballots per ward (for six wards).
Scantegrity published the commitments on October 13
2009 at 12:13am.
Meeting 2 In Meeting 2, held on October 14, 2009,
trustees used Scantegrity-written code to respond to chal-
lenges generated using stock market data at closing on
October 14. Half of the ballot decryption paths commit-
ted to in Meeting 1 were opened. Additionally, trustees
constructed ballots (associations between candidates and
confirmation codes) at this meeting, and generated com-
mitments to them. Scantegrity published the stock mar-
ket data, the challenges, and the responses.
Ballot Design The ballot used for the 2009 election
was based on ballots used for the 2007 election. We
made the conscious choice to modify (as little as pos-
sible) a design already used successfully in a past elec-
tion, and not to use the ballot we had designed for the
mock election. The main reason for reusing the ballot
design was that it would be familiar to voters. The ballot
was required to contain instructions in both English and
Spanish: marking instructions, instructions for write-ins,
instructions for IRV and any Scantegrity-related instruc-
tions (see Figure 2).
Printing Ballots We use “invisible” ink to print the
marking positions that reveal confirmation codes to vot-
ers. We used refillable inkjet cartridges in multiple color
8
Tear-off line Ward number
Reactive ink,
darkens when
marked with
pen
2D machine-
readable bar codeAlignment mark
For voter to look up
online
Figure 2: An unmarked Takoma Park 2009 ballot for Ward 1 showing instructions in Spanish and English, the options,
the circular alignment marks, the 2D barcode, the ballot serial number (on the stub, meant for poll workers to keep
track of the number of ballot used) and the online verification number (for voters to check their codes). The true ballot
was printed on legal size paper and was hence larger than shown.
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positions of an Epson R280 printer to print confirmation
codes. The ink is not actually invisible, but looks like
a yellow bubble before marking and a dark bubble with
light yellow codes after marking. 15
We initially began printing with 6 printers, but they
proved unreliable. It was our expectation that using large
amounts of commodity hardware would scale, but it did
not. We did not anticipate the number of failure modes
we experienced and our printing process was delayed by
approximately 1 and a half days.
Ballot Delivery Mail-in (absentee) ballots were deliv-
ered to the City Clerk on 16 October. Early, in-person
voting ballots were delivered on October 27 for early vot-
ing on October 28, and all other ballots a couple of days
later on October 30.
Absentee ballots were identical to in-person voting
ballots except they did not contain online verification
numbers and voters were not given any instructions on
checking confirmation numbers online. They were re-
turned by mail in double envelopes and scanned with
the early votes. Confirmation numbers for these ballots
were, however, made available online after scanning, so
that there was no distinction in published data between
absentee and in-person voted ballots.
The board decided to issue ballots without confirma-
tion numbers due to the small number of anticipated ab-
sentee votes and the costs associated with mailing ballots
with special pens. Mailing the ballots with confirmation
codes would allow verification of confirmation codes, but
opens up new attacks: the possibility of false charges of
election fraud by adversaries who might expose confir-
mation codes and reprint ballots, or use expensive equip-
ment to attempt to determine the invisible codes. Strong
verification for absentee ballots is an ongoing research
subject within the Scantegrity team.
Early in-person voters used Scantegrity ballots with
all Scantegrity functionality, except that the early votes
were scanned in after the polls closed on Election Day,
and not by voters themselves. Voters were, however,
provided verification cards and could check confirmation
codes for these ballots online.
Poll Worker Training Several training sessions were
held in the weeks prior to the election. Manuals from the
previous election were updated and a companion guide
was created with Scantegrity-specific instructions. Elec-
tion judges were given these two manuals, and a member
from our team demonstrated the voting process at one
session.
15See http://scantegrity.org/˜carback1/ink for
more information on the printing process
Voter Education Voter education for this election fo-
cused on online verification. Articles in the City news-
paper before the real election indicated that voters could
check confirmation numbers online; this was also an-
nounced on the city’s election website. 16
Scanner Setup We attempted to minimize, not pre-
vent, 17 the potential for using the wrong software by
installing our software on top of Ubuntu Linux on SD
flash cards, setting the “read-only” switch on each card,
and setting up the software to read and write to USB
sticks. We fingerprinted the first card after testing with
the sha1sum utility and cloned it to a second card for
the other netbook. Each netbook was set to boot from
the card and BIOS configuration was locked with a pass-
word.
Both flash cards were checked with the sha1sum utility
then placed into the netbook which was placed into a lock
box and delivered to Takoma Park. The USB sticks were
initialized with scanner configuration files. We uniquely
identified each scanner by changing the ScannerID field
in the configuration files, then we placed the correspond-
ing USB sticks (3 for each netbook) into the lock box.
Upon delivery of the scanners the day before the elec-
tion, we gave election officials the lock box keys and
showed them how to open the lock boxes. We confirmed
with election officials the contents of each box and the
officials verified, with our assistance, that the USB mem-
ory sticks did not contain any ballot data by looking at
the configuration file and making sure the ballot data file
was blank. 18 To protect against virus infection on the
sticks we set them to read-only for this procedure.
6.2 Election Day
On Election Day, November 3, 2009, polls were open
from 7 am to 8 pm at a single polling location, the
Takoma Park Community Center. Several members of
the SVST were present through most of the day in the
building in case of technical difficulty. One SVST mem-
ber was permitted in the polling room at most times as an
observer, and a couple of SVST members were present
in the vestibule giving out and collecting survey forms
through most of the day. Lillie Coney of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, who performed a print audit
on the request of the Board of Elections, was present in
the polling room through a large part of the day.
16http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/clerk/election/
2009/
17Scantegrity would detect manipulation at the scanner. A better
solution would use trusted hardware technology (e.g. a TPM [14]).
18These were the only 2 files on the disk at this time. Additionally,
election officials did not check fingerprints on the flash cards. Since no
3rd party had reviewed the code or fingerprinted it they relied on our
chain of custody.
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Starting the Election The scanner was the only SVST
equipment to set up and it was a turn key system. Elec-
tion judges needed to plug in the USB sticks and power
on the netbooks. The scanner was attached to a scan-
ning apparatus, and cables were run into the lockbox that
contained the netbook. When ready, the scanner would
beep 3 times. After reading a ballot, the scanner would
beep 1 time. During shutdown, the scanner would beep
another 3 times. If there were any failure modes the scan-
ner would beep continuously or not beep at all.
Election judges set up the check-in tables, pollbooks,
and voting booths. The election started on time.
Voting The election proceeded quite smoothly, with
very few (small) glitches. An SVST member was able
to assist polling officials in fixing a problem with their
poll books (not provided by Scantegrity). Voters had
some initial problems with the use of the scanner and
the privacy sleeve, some seeking assistance from elec-
tion judges who also had difficulty. After an explanation
to the election judges by the Chair of the Board of Elec-
tions, the use of the scanner was considerably smoother.
With a few ballots, the privacy sleeve was not letting
go of the ballots; one ballot was mangled considerably
but scanned fine. Seventeen scanned ballots had lines on
them that caused the scanner to be unable to read votes,
and one ballot had alignment marks manipulated such
that it was also unreadable. Images of all unreadable
scans are saved, so we were able to manually enter in
these votes. Of the seventeen ballots, many ballots had a
line in the same location, which is consistent with there
being a foreign substance on a ballot put into the scan-
ner. These problems did not affect our ability to count
the votes.
During the day, Ms. Coney chose about fifty ballots at
random, uniformly distributed across wards, and exposed
the confirmation codes for all options for the ballots. A
copy of each ballot was made for her to take with her;
the copies were signed by the Chair of the BoE. Neither
Ms. Coney nor SVST members had any interaction with
voters.
Towards the end of the day, after the local NPR sta-
tion carried clips from an interview with the Chair of the
Board of Elections and a voter, the polling station saw a
large increase in the number of voters, with the line tak-
ing up much of the floor outside the polling room. The
SVST prepared to print more ballots, but this was not re-
quired. The number of printed ballots ended up being
almost twice the number of voted ballots.
Absentee and early voted ballots were scanned in af-
ter the closing of polls. Afterward, the scanners were
shut down. The chief judge opened each lock box, set
all sticks to read only, removed 2 USB sticks (leaving
the third with the scanning netbook), and locked the lock
box. Our team was given 1 stick for the ERM system.
The other was kept by the city.
In Meeting 3a, trustees used Scantegrity code to gen-
erate results without provisional ballots at about 10 pm.
The Chair of the Board of Election announced the results
to those present at the polling place at the time (including
candidates, their representatives, voters, etc.); this was
also televised live by the local TV station. Confirma-
tion codes and the election day tally were posted on the
Scantegrity website.
6.3 After the Election
On the next day, around 2 pm, results including verified
provisional ballots were published. Takoma Park rep-
resentatives had announced a tally without provisional
ballots the night before, and followed with the tally that
included verified provisionals in accordance with stan-
dard Takoma Park procedures. The final Meeting 3 re-
sults were published on November 4th just before mid-
night.
The number of registered voters were 10,934 and 1728
votes were cast (15.8%). The city-certified final tally for
each contest is provided in Table 1. In each race, a ma-
jority was won after tallying after the voter’s first choice.
Hand Count and Certification Following a hand
count performed by representatives from both the SVST
and Takoma Park, the Chair of the Board of Elections
certified the results of the hand count to the City Council
at 7 pm on November 5. The hand count and the Scant-
egrity count differed because officials were able to better
determine voter intent during the hand count. For exam-
ple, in the mayoral race, the scanner count determined
that 646 votes were cast for candidate Schlegel, 972 for
Williams, 15 for various write-in candidates, and 90 were
not cast. The certified hand count totals were 664 votes
for Schlegel, 1000 for Williams and 17 for write-in can-
didates. Thus 48 of a total of 1681 votes in this race
would not have been counted by a scanner count alone.
The discrepancy was caused by voters marking ballots
outside of the designated marking areas. Such marks,
while not read by the scanner by definition, are consid-
ered valid votes by Takoma Park law. Similarly, 8 of a
total of 447 votes for Ward 1 council member, 8 of 251
for Ward 2, 16 of 431 for Ward 3, 10 of 210 for Ward 4,
2 of 81 for Ward 5 and 11 of 199 for Ward 6 were added
to scanner vote totals after hand counting.
Post-Election Audit During Meeting 4, held on
November 6 at 6 p.m., trustees used Scantegrity-written
code to reveal all codes on voted ballots, and to reveal ev-
erything for all the ballots that were not spoiled or voted
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Mayor Votes Ward Councilor Votes Ward Councilor Votes
Roger B. Schlegel 664 Ward 1 Josh Wright 434 Ward 4 Terry Seamens 196
Bruce Williams 1000 Write-ins 13 Eric Mendoza 12
Write-ins 17 Ward 2 Colleen Clay 236 Write-ins 2
Write-ins 15 Ward 5 Reuben Snipper 71
Ward 3 Dan Robinson 397 Write-ins 10
Write-ins 34 Ward 6 Navid Nasr 61
Fred Schultz 138
Write-ins 0
Table 1: City certified election results for the Mayor’s race and each City Councilman’s race.
upon. Trustees also responded to pseudo-random chal-
lenges generated by stock market results at closing on
November 6. Scantegrity published all data on Novem-
ber 7th around 9am. While the SVST could have chosen
to use closing data on an earlier date, such as November
4 or November 5, which could have been more stable,
the team chose to stick to its earlier-announced plan (of
using the freshest stock market data) for the sake of con-
sistency.
On November 9, 2009, Dr. Adida and Dr. Zago´rski
independently confirmed that Scantegrity correctly re-
sponded to all digital challenges. In particular, they
confirmed that the tally computation audit data was cor-
rect. Both made available independently-written code on
their websites that voters and others could use to check
the tally computation commitments. The Chair of the
BoE mentions that several voters have shown an interest
in running the code made available by Drs. Adida and
Zago´rski, and that she expects that Takoma Park voters
will use the code to perform some audits themselves in
the next few months.
Confirmation Codes and Complaints The period for
complaints regarding the election (including complaints
about missing confirmation codes) expired at 6 pm on
November 6. The Scantegrity website recorded 81
unique ballot ID verifications, of which about 66 (almost
4% of the total votes) were performed before the dead-
line. The SVST was also told by a BoE member that
at least a few voters checked codes on auditor websites.
Both Dr. Adida and Dr. Zago´rski made the confirmation
codes available on their websites after the election.
The number of voters who checked their ballots on-
line before the Takoma Park complaint deadline (66),
while not large, was sufficient to have detected (with
high probability) any errors or fraud large enough to have
changed the election outcome. (Detailed calculations
omitted here; these calculations are not so simple, due
to the use of IRV.)
Scantegrity received a single complaint by a voter who
had trouble deciphering a digit in the code and noted it
as “0,” while the Scantegrity website presented it as “8.”
The voter requested that codes be printed more clearly in
the future. He also stated that if he were not a trusting
individual, he would believe that he had proof that his
vote was altered.
All codes for all voted ballots were revealed after
the dispute resolution period, and all commitments ver-
ified by two independent auditors, Dr. Adida and Dr.
Zago´rski. Hence, the probability that the code was in er-
ror is very small, albeit non-zero. Scantegrity does not
believe the code was in error, and there were no other
complaints regarding confirmation numbers.
Print Audits Dr. Zago´rski provided an interface al-
lowing Ms. Coney to check the commitments
opened by Scantegrity in Meeting 4 against the
candidate/confirmation-code correspondence on the bal-
lots she audited. In her report [12], she confirmed that
the correspondence between confirmation numbers and
candidates on all the printed ballots audited by her was
correctly provided by the interface.
Followup The Board of Elections and an SVST rep-
resentative met to discuss the election and opportunities
for improvement several weeks after the election. Both
sides were largely satisfied with the election. Conversa-
tions have begun regarding the use of Scantegrity in the
next municipal election at Takoma Park, to be held in
November 2011. No decisions have been taken.
7 Surveys and Observations of Voter Expe-
riences
To understand the experiences of voters and poll workers,
we timed some of the voters as they voted, asked voters
and poll workers to fill out two questionnaires, and in-
formally solicited comments from voters as they left the
precinct building. Approved by the Board of Elections
and UMBC’s Institutional Review Board, our procedures
respected the constraint of not interfering with the elec-
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tion process. This section summarizes the results of our
observations and surveys.
Timing Data Sitting unobtrusively as official ob-
servers in a designated area of the polling room for part
of the day, two helpers (not members of the Scantegrity
team) timed 93 voters as they carried out the voting pro-
cess. Using stopwatches, they measured the number of
seconds that transpired from the time the voter received
a ballot to the time the voter began walking away from
the scanner.
Voting times ranged from 55 secs. to 10mins. (the
second longest time was 385 secs.), with a mean of 167
secs. and a median of 150 secs. On average, voters who
appeared older took longer than voters who appeared
younger. Most of the time was spent marking the bal-
lot. The average time to vote was significantly faster
than during the April 2009 mock election, when voters
took approximately 8 mins. on average due primarily to
scanning delays [26].
The observers noted that many voters did not fully use
the privacy sleeve as intended, removing the ballot before
scanning rather than inserting the privacy sleeve with the
ballot into the scanning slot. Two of the 93 observed
voters initially inserted the privacy sleeve upside-down,
causing the ballot not to be fed into the scanner (even
though the scanner could read the ballot in any orienta-
tion). A few ran into difficulties trying to insert the sleeve
with one hand while holding something else in the other
hand.
Election Day Comments From Voters As voters left
the precinct building, members of the Scantegrity team
conducting the written surveys, and a helper (a usability
expert who is not a member of the Scantegrity team) so-
licited comments from voters with questions like, “What
did you think of the new voting system?” The helper so-
licited comments 1:30-3:00pm and 7-8pm. A common
response was, “It was easy.”
Quite a few voters did not understand that they could
verify their votes on-line and that, to do so, they had
to write down the codenumbers revealed by their bal-
lot choices. Some explained that they intentionally did
not read any instructions because they “knew how to
vote.” Others failed to notice or understand instructions
on posters along the waiting line, in the voting booth, on
the ballot, and in the Takoma Park Newsletter.
In response, later in the day, we announced to voters
as they entered the building that there is a new system;
to verify your vote, write down the codenumbers. These
verbal announcements seemed to have some positive ef-
fect, and there were fewer voter comments expressing
lack of awareness of the verification option after we be-
gan the announcements. Nevertheless, some voters still
were unaware of the verification option. It was a hum-
bling experience to see first-hand how difficult it can be
to get across the most basic points effectively, especially
the first time a new system is used.
Some of the voters complained about the double-
ended pen, not knowing which end to use, or having trou-
ble writing in candidates with the chisel-point (the nar-
row point was intended for write-ins). A small number
of voters had difficulty seeing the codenumbers, perhaps
largely because repeatedly pressing too hard could erode
the paper. A few voters expressed concern about the dif-
ficulty of writing down the codenumbers, had the ballot
been much longer or had there been a large number of
competing candidates.
Many voters expressed a strong confidence in the in-
tegrity of elections, while a small minority expressed
sharp distrust in previous electronic election technology.
These feelings seemed to be based more on a general
subjective belief rather than on detailed knowledge of
election procedures and technology. Similarly, those ex-
pressing strong confidence in Scantegrity seemed to like
the concept of verification but did not understand in de-
tail why Scantegrity provides high outcome assurance.
Survey of Voter Experiences As voters were leaving
the precinct, we invited them to fill out two one-sided
survey forms: a field-study questionnaire, and a demo-
graphics questionnaire. The field study asked voters
about the voting system they just used, with most an-
swers expressed on a seven-point Likert scale. The last
question invited voters to make any additional sugges-
tions or comments. Each pair of forms had matching
serial numbers to permit correlation of the field study
responses with demographics. 271 voters filled out the
forms.
Fifty-one voters wrote comments on the question-
naires, often pointing out confusion about various as-
pects of the process but with no consistent theme. (1)
Some were unaware of verification option. (2) Some did
not realize they were supposed to write down codenum-
bers. (3) Some found the pens confusing to use: they
did not realize that the pens would expose codenumbers,
and they did not know which end to use. (4) Some found
codenumbers were hard to read. (5) Some did not under-
stand how to mark an IRV ballot. (6) Some did not know
how to place the ballot into the scanner. (7) One had no
difficulty but wondered if seniors or people who speak
neither English nor Spanish might have difficulties. (8)
One wondered if the government might be able to discern
his vote by linking his IP address used during verification
with his ballot serial number and noting the time that he
was issued a ballot (this may be possible if the cryptogra-
phy is broken or in other scenarios, but it would be more
direct to have the scanner log how he voted). (9) Many
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suggested that it would have been helpful to have better
instructions, including instruction while they wait in line.
Figure 3 shows how voters responded to four ques-
tions from the field study questionnaire. These results
strongly show that voters found the voting system easy
to use (Question 5), and that they had confidence in the
system (Question 13). Question 10 showed that the op-
tion to check votes on line increased voter confidence in
the election results. Question 9 showed that voters had
confidence that the receipt alone did not reveal how they
voted; this finding is notable given that it is widely sus-
pected that many people erroneously believe that all E2E
receipts reveal ballot choices. We plan to present detailed
analysis of our complete survey data in a separate com-
panion paper.
Survey of Poll Worker Experiences Each of the
twelve poll workers was given an addressed and stamped
envelope with two questionnaires (field study and demo-
graphics) to fill out and mail to the researchers after the
election. The field study focused on their experiences ad-
ministering Scantegrity, with most answer expressed on
a seven-point Likert scale. This questionnaire also in-
cluded four open-ended questions. Each pair of forms
had matching serial numbers. Five forms were returned.
Poll workers noted the following difficulties. (1) There
was too much information. (2) Some voters did not un-
derstand what to do, including how to create a receipt.
(3) Some voters did not understand how to mark an IRV
ballot. (4) The privacy sleeve was hard to use with one
hand. (5) The double-ended pens created confusion. (6)
Voters, poll workers, and the Scantegrity team have dif-
ferent needs. One wondered if Scantegrity was worth the
extra trouble.
They offered the following suggestions: (1) Simplify
the ballot. (2) Provide receipts so that voters do not have
to copy codenumbers. (3) Develop better pre-election
voter education.
8 Discussion and Lessons Learned
Overall, this project should be deemed a success: the
goals of the election were met, and there were no ma-
jor snafus. Many aspects of the Scantegrity design and
implementation worked well, while some could be im-
proved in future elections.
Technology Challenges Perhaps the most challenging
aspect for future elections is scaling up ballot printing.
The printers we used were not very reliable.
Variations on the Scantegrity design worth exploring
include the printing of voter receipts (rather than hav-
ing voters copy confirmation codes by hand)—there are
clearly security aspects to handle if one does this. The
design should also be extended for better accessibility.
The special pen might be improved by having only a sin-
gle medium-tip point, rather than two tips of different
sizes. The scanning operation and its interaction with
the privacy sleeve should be studied and improved.
The website, while sufficient, might utilize existing re-
search in distributed systems to reduce the expectations
on observers and voters. The scanner could also be im-
proved with more sophisticated image analysis, and also
to better handle unreadable ballots. It only occured to
us after the election that the write-in resolution process
could have greater utility if it were expanded to deal with
unreadable and unclear ballots.
Real World Deployment of Research Systems As is
common with many projects, too much was left until
the last minute. Better project management would have
been helpful, and key aspects should have been finalized
earlier. Materials and procedures should be more exten-
sively tested beforehand.
One of the most important lessons learned is the
value of close collaboration and clear communication be-
tween election officials and the election system providers
(whether they be researchers or vendors).
Another lesson learned is that it is both important to
provide voters with clear explanations of the new fea-
tures of a voting system, and to do so efficiently, with
minimal impact on throughput. Resolving the tension
between these requirements definitely needs further ex-
ploration. For example, it might be worthwhile to have
an instructional video explaining the Scantegrity system
that voters could watch as they come in. The permanent
adoption of Scantegrity II in a jurisdiction would, how-
ever, alleviate the educational burden over time, as voters
learn the system’s features in successive elections.
Comparison with post-election audits It is interest-
ing to compare Scantegrity with the other major tech-
nique for election outcome verification: post-election au-
dits. Because these audits do not allow anyone to check
that a particular ballot was counted correctly, they do
not provide the level of integrity guarantee provided by
Scantegrity.
Post-election audits, even those with redundant digital
and physical records like optical scan systems, only ad-
dress errors or malfeasance in the counting of votes and
not in the chain of custody. 19 In contrast, end-to-end
19Having multiple records may make an attacker’s job harder, but
note that the attacker only has to change the record that will ultimately
be used and/or trusted (not necessarily both). Also, redudancy can work
against a system, as changing a digital record in an obviously malicious
way may allow time for a more subtle manipulation of the physical
record.
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Figure 3: Voter responses to Survey Questions 5, 9, 10, 13 from all 271 voters completing the survey. Using a seven-
point Likert scale, voters indicated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each statement about the voting system
they had just used (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Each histogram shows the number of voters responding
for each of the seven agreement levels. The four questions shown are the following: (5) Overall, the voting system was
easy to use. (9) I have confidence that my receipt by itself does not reveal how I voted. (10) The option to verify my
vote online afterwards increases my confidence in the election results. (13) I have confidence in this voting system.
voting systems such as Scantegrity provide a “verifiable
chain of custody.” Voters can check that their ballots are
included in the tally, and anyone—not just a privileged
group of auditors—can check that those ballots are tal-
lied as intended.
It must be admitted, however, that the additional in-
tegrity benefits provided by Scantegrity II come at the
cost of somewhat increased complexity and at the cost
of an increased (but manageable) risk to voter privacy
(since ballots are uniquely identifiable). That said, some
jurisdictions and/or election systems require or use serial
numbers on ballots anyway, and we have proposed sev-
eral possible approaches to appropriately destroy or ob-
fuscate serial number information. Furthermore, it can
be argued that a voter wishing to ”fingerprint” a ballot
can do so without being detected in current paper ballot
systems simply by marking ovals in distinctive ways.
9 Conclusions
Traditional opscan voting systems have the clear bene-
fit that “votes are verifiably cast as intended”—the voter
can see for herself that the ballot is correctly filled out.
Yet once her ballot is cast, the voter must place her trust
in others that ballots are safely collected and correctly
counted. With end-to-end voting systems these last two
operations (collecting ballots and counting them) are ver-
ifiable as well: voters can verify—using their receipt and
a website—that their ballot is safely collected with the
others, and anyone can use the website data to verify that
the ballots have been correctly counted. The Scantegrity
II voting system provides such end-to-end verification
capability as an overlay on top of traditional opscan tech-
nology. Further development should improve scalability
(esp. printing), usability (e.g. with printed receipts) and
accessibility of the Scantegrity II system.
The successful use of the Scantegrity II voting sys-
tem in the Takoma Park election of November 3, 2009
demonstrates that voters and election officials can use so-
phisticated cryptographic techniques to organize a trans-
parent secret ballot election with a familiar voting experi-
ence. The election results show considerable satisfaction
by both voters and pollworkers, indicating that end-to-
end voting technology has matured to the point of being
ready and usable for real binding governmental elections.
This paper thus documents a significant step forward in
the security and integrity of voting systems as used in
practice.
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